Studying games in the complete information model makes them analytically tractable. However, large n player interactions are more realistically modeled as games of incomplete information, where players may know little to nothing about the types of other players. Unfortunately, games in incomplete information settings lose many of the nice properties of complete information games: the quality of equilibria can become worse, the equilibria lose their ex-post properties, and coordinating on an equilibrium becomes even more difficult. Because of these problems, we would like to study games of incomplete information, but still implement equilibria of the complete information game induced by the (unknown) realized player types.
INTRODUCTION
Atomic congestion games are a well studied class of games, modeling interactions in which agents choose some subset of "resources" to utilize, and pay a cost for each resource which is a function of the number of players using it. Examples include traffic routing games, fair cost sharing games, and many others. Moreover, when modeled as games of complete information, they have a number of nice properties. They are exact potential games [Monderer and Shapley 1996] which implies that they always have pure strategy Nash equilibria, and best-response dynamics quickly converges to approximate pure strategy Nash equilibria (although finding exact pure strategy Nash equilibria remains PLS complete [Fabrikant et al. 2004] ). When the cost functions on each edge are linear, the price of anarchy over pure strategy Nash equilibria is only 2.5 [Christodoulou and Koutsoupias 2005; Awerbuch et al. 2005] , and this bound extends without degradation to other equilibria concepts of the complete information game, including correlated equilibrium and coarse correlated equilibrium [Blum et al. 2008; Roughgarden 2009] 1 . However, when considering large n player games, the complete information model is a simplifying assumption designed to make equilibrium analysis more tractablebut is not realistic. It assumes that each of the n players know one another's type (e.g. their source-destination pair in a traffic routing game), but in reality, these n "players" may have little to no contact with one another, and might not even be aware of each other's existence. In fact, if one's type can represent sensitive information, then players might be actively opposed to letting other players learn their type. A more realistic model is one of incomplete information, in which players do not know each other's types with certainty. A popular abstraction for games of incomplete information are Bayesian games: in this model, the players' types are drawn from a known prior distribution over the joint type-space (i.e. types are not necessarily drawn i.i.d., but might be correlated). This model has its own equilibrium solution concepts: for example, a Bayes-Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies for each player (which are now functions mapping types to actions), such that no player, even after seeing her type, can unilaterally deviate to a different strategy and improve her payoff in expectation over the draws of her opponents' unknown types. Unfortunately, some of the nice properties of congestion games no longer hold when they are modeled as Bayesian games. One of the most alarming is the price of anarchy. Roughgarden observes that even for traffic routing games with linear cost functions (a setting in which all equilibria of the complete information game have a price of anarchy of only 2.5), the price of anarchy over the set of Bayes-Nash equilibria when types may be correlated can be unboundedly large [Roughgarden 2012 ]. Moreover, the guarantees of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium do not hold ex-post, and this solution concept is brittle to agents' knowledge of the prior distribution.
In this paper, we ask how we can recover the appealing properties of the complete information game when we find ourselves in a setting of incomplete information: in particular, can we implement Nash equilibria of the complete information game defined by the realized player types as Bayes-Nash equilibria of the game of incomplete information? Asking this question in another way: can we implement ex-post equilibria in the incomplete information game, and thereby dispense with agents need to know a common prior distribution? We answer the question in the affirmative when the game in question is "large": a natural condition that roughly speaking, requires that no player i's unilateral change in action can have significant affect on the cost of any player j = i. In such games, we can implement approximate pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced complete information game as approximate Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the incomplete information game by introducing an extremely weak mediator -and the approximation loss tends to zero as the size of the game grows large. The mediator we introduce has very little power: in the setting of traffic routing games, it is helpful to think of the mediator as a GPS device. It provides players the option to report their type, and then it suggests an action. However, players can choose not to use the mediator at all, and merely play in the game themselves. They can also choose to misreport their type to the mediator, and the mediator has no ability to enforce its suggestions: players are free to ignore its suggestion, or deviate using some more complicated function of the suggested action. What we show is that the "good behavior" -in which everyone truthfully reports their type to the mediator, and then faithfully follows its suggestion -forms an approximate Bayes-Nash equilibrium, and that when players do this, the play that results is an approximate pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced complete information game. Moreover, the mechanism that defines the mediator does not require any knowledge of the prior distribution on types: the results hold simultaneously for all possible priors. This is because we in fact prove something stronger: our mechanism makes truthful reporting an approximate Nash equilibrium in every complete information game that might be induced by any set of player types, and so in particular, for any distribution over types. This stronger feature means that our algorithm retains the same guarantees even in substantially weaker settings of incomplete information: it makes good behavior an ex-post equilibrium, and so does not require agents to have any knowledge of the prior distribution (or even require that agent types are drawn from a distribution at all!)
Our mediator may also be viewed as solving the equilibrium selection problem in large congestion games. Even in a complete information game, there may be multiple equilibria and different equilibria may be preferred by different players. In general, players have no way of coordinating to play on a particular equilibrium. Using our mediator, they do: under truthful reporting, the mediator selects a particular Nash equilibrium, and we guarantee that no player has incentive to either misreport their type or disregard the suggested play.
Our Techniques
The natural approach of designing a mediator which simply computes an (exact) Nash equilibrium of the complete information game induced by reported types fails. It is tempting to think that players would have no incentive to deviate by the Nash equilibrium condition, but this is false (even in large games) because a player's report to an algorithm computing a Nash equilibrium may affect the action suggested to every player, and so a unilateral deviation in one's reported type can result in different suggested plays for every player -a form of deviation not protected by the Nash equilibrium condition. For specific examples of ways in which this naïve approach fails, see the discussion in [Kearns et al. 2014 ].
What we would like is a mediator which computes a Nash equilibrium of a game in such a way so that for every player i the actions suggested to players j = i are somehow "insensitive" to player i's reported type. If this were so, then player i could no longer usefully benefit by deviating: if he cannot affect the actions of his opponents, the best thing that he can do is best-respond to them, which is exactly what occurs if he truthfully reports his type and then follows the suggested (Nash equilibrium) action. To accomplish this, we follow the approach of the recent work of Kearns et al [Kearns et al. 2014] and design an algorithm for computing an approximate equilibrium under the constraint of joint differential privacy, a technical condition formalizing the notion that one's reported type does not "substantially" affect the suggested actions to any of the other players. To compute an approximate Nash equilibrium, we simulate best-response dynamics, which is known to quickly converge to approximate Nash equilibrium in congestion games. In order to do this privately, we show two things: first, in large games, we can run an approximate version of best response dynamics that limits the number of times any single player has to make a best response (even if the total number of best responses needed might remain large). This serves the purpose of limiting the "sensitivity" of the intermediate states of the game to any single player's reported utility function. Second, we show that best-response dynamics can be carried out in a noise-tolerant way, using only noisy approximate counts for how many players are currently on each facility.
Related Work
Our work is part of a line of work studying mechanism design in "large" games or economies: when the influence of any particular player on the outcome is small (the sense in which "influence" is intended varies in these works). This line of work dates back at least to [Roberts and Postlewaite 1976] , which showed that Walrasian equilibrium yield approximately strategy proof mechanisms in economies which are "large" in a certain sense. More recently, [Immorlica and Mahdian 2005] , [Kojima and Pathak 2009] , [Kojima et al. 2010] have studied the incentive properties of two-sided matching mechanisms in large markets, again showing that they are approximately strategy proof under certain conditions. Bodoh-Creed [Bodoh-Creed 2013] has studied the incentive properties of uniform price auctions in large markets. The most general result is that of [Azevedo and Budish 2011] who design approximately strategy-proof mechanisms for large economies which satisfy a certain "smoothness condition". This condition can be hard to verify however, and their mechanism is not generally efficient. Moreover, in order to get incentive properties, [Azevedo and Budish 2011] need the size of the game n to grow larger than the size of the action set and the type space. In a congestion game with d facilities, the size of the type space can be as large as 2
In contrast, the main attraction of our work is that it is algorithmically constructive, requires no condition on the game other than low sensitivity of the utility functions, and requires only that the size of the game be asymptotically larger than d (which represents a doubly exponential improvement in how large the game must be before incentive results kick in). However, these improvements come at a cost: our result holds only for congestion games.
The "largeness condition" that we require (informally, that a player's action affects the payoff of all other players by a small amount) is closely related to the literature on large games, see e.g. [Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky 2000] or [Kalai 2004 ]. There has been recent work studying large games using tools from theoretical computer science Reingold 2008, 2010 ] -but the goals of these papers are largely orthogonal to ours.
Our work is also related to the literature on mediators in games Tennenholtz 2003, 2009] . In contrast to our main goal (which is to implement solution concepts of the complete information game in settings of incomplete information), this line of work aims to modify the equilibrium structure of complete information game. It does so by introducing a mediator, which can coordinate agent actions if they choose to opt in using the mediator. Mediators can be used to convert Nash equilibria into dominant strategy equilibria [Monderer and Tennenholtz 2003 ], or implement equilibrium that are robust to collusion . [Ashlagi et al. 2009 ] considers mediators in games of incomplete information, in which agents can misrepresent their type to the mediators. Our notion of a mediator is related, but our mediators require substantially less power than the ones from this literature. For example, our mechanisms do not need the power to make payments [Monderer and Tennenholtz 2003] , or the power to enforce suggested actions . Like the mediators of [Ashlagi et al. 2009 ], ours are designed to work in settings of incomplete information and so do not need the power to verify agent types -but our mediators are weaker, in that they can only make suggestions (i.e. players do not need to cede control to our weak mediators).
The paper most related to ours is Kearns et al. [Kearns et al. 2014] , which introduces the goal of coordinating equilibria of the complete information game in settings of incomplete information, and accomplishes this task (as we do) by introducing a mediator and computing an equilibrium of the game induced by reported types under the constraint of joint differential privacy (a variant of differential privacy which is also introduced in [Kearns et al. 2014] ). The mediator of [Kearns et al. 2014 ] computes a correlated equilibrium, and as a result, the main shortcoming of [Kearns et al. 2014] is that they cannot allow players to mis-represent their types to the mediator: or alternately, that mediators have the ability to verify player types. Hence, although [Kearns et al. 2014] can allow players to opt-out of using the mediator, or opt-in but ignore its suggested actions, the incentive properties proven in [Kearns et al. 2014] fail to hold in the case when players have the power to lie about their types. Correcting this deficiency was highlighted as an open problem. In this work, we solve this problem by designing a mediator which computes a Nash equilibrium of the underlying game, rather than a correlated equilibrium. This results in a mediator which induces truthful reporting at equilibrium even without the ability to verify player types. Our approach also has several more advantages: in the context of congestion games, our algorithms are far more efficient than those of [Kearns et al. 2014] : The algorithms in [Kearns et al. 2014 ] require time at least polynomial in the number of actions in the game (and for the polynomial time variant of the algorithm in [Kearns et al. 2014] , the approximation loss in the truthfulness guarantee also scales polynomially with the number of actions in the game). For congestion games, the number of actions per player can be exponential in the natural parameters in the game 2 . In contrast, our running time and approximation guarantees are all polynomial in the number of players, as well as the description length of the game. Since we compute pure strategy Nash equilibria, they always achieve equilibrium outcomes even ex-post. However, for these improvements, we give up generality: the results of [Kearns et al. 2014] hold for arbitrary large games, whereas the results of this paper are specific to large congestion games.
Differential privacy was introduced by Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith, and has since become a standard "privacy solution concept" in the theoretical computer science literature [Dwork et al. 2006] . The privacy literature is now extremely large: for a textbook introduction, see [Dwork and Roth 2013] -we here mention only the tools from this literature that we use. Our mediator actually computes an equilibrium under the relaxation of differential privacy (known as joint-differential privacy) introduced by [Kearns et al. 2014] . Importantly, this relaxation allows the suggested action sent to player i to be highly sensitive in the report of player i, which is crucial for equilibrium computation. Our algorithm requires the ability to privately maintain a count of a stream of numbers which arrives online, while having strong accuracy guarantees for the count on every subsequence of the stream. This is known as requiring differential privacy under continual observation, and counters satisfying these desiderata were given by Dwork et al. [Dwork et al. 2010] and Chan et al. [Chan et al. 2011] .
Finally, our paper relates to a recent literature exploring connections between game theory and differential privacy, which was initiated by the seminal work of McSherry and Talwar [McSherry and Talwar 2007] . For a survey of this area, see [Pai and Roth 2013] . Our work fits into the stream of this literature which uses differential privacy as a tool in mechanism design independently of privacy concerns [McSherry and Talwar 2007; Nissim et al. 2012; Kearns et al. 2014] . It also fits into a literature concerned with computing different equilibrium solution concepts under the constraint of differential privacy: e.g. correlated equilibrium [Kearns et al. 2014] , min-max equilibrium [Hsu et al. 2013b] , and Walrasian equilibrium [Hsu et al. 2013a ].
MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
For concreteness, our exposition will focus on traffic routing games, but our results hold for arbitrary congestion games. An instance of a congestion game with n players is given by a set of facilities E together with a loss function e for each facility e ∈ E. Actions in a congestion game correspond to subsets of facilities, possibly from a restricted set defined by the players' types. For a routing game G the facilities E are the edges of a directed graph G = (V, E), with |E| = m. The actions in the routing game will be paths in the graph, which are subsets of the edges. Further, there is a loss function e : R → [0, 1] for each edge that maps the number of people traveling on the edge to a value between zero and one. Note that if a player changes his route, he can impact the count on each edge by at most one. We define the sensitivity of a loss function to quantify how much a player can impact the loss on each edge by a unilateral deviation.
Definition 2.1. (Sensitivity) The sensitivity ∆ for an instance of the routing game G defined by G = (V, E) and { e } e∈E is defined as
| e (y e + 1) − e (y e )| .
Each player has a type s from some typespace U. For a routing game U = V × V corresponds to the set of source-destination pairs in G (and a type s specifies a particular source and destination pair). In the general setting, players can be of type s i ∈ T where T is some abstract type space of arbitrary size. Our theorems have no dependence on |T |, which can in principle be arbitrarily large. A player's type s i specifies an allowable action space for that player R i . In a traffic routing game, R i represents the set of all simple paths in G between the source-destination pair specified by s i . We write R to denote the union of all action spaces: in traffic routing games, the set of all simple paths in G. It will also be useful to refer to the length of the longest path in G, which we denote by L. In the general congestion game setting, L corresponds to the maximum cardinality of any action (which we recall is a subset of facilities).
Players wish to minimize their cost, which is the sum of the losses on the facilities (edges) that they play on. For a set of n players with type profile s = (s i ) n i=1 , we denote the vector of their chosen routes by r = (r i ) n i=1 ∈ R 1 ×· · ·×R n . For a given route-profile, we will denote the number of people on edge e ∈ E to be y e (r), which for simplicity we will write as y e when the route-profile is understood. We now consider the cost of a player of type s i with a given route profile.
Our goal is to implement Nash Equilibria of the complete information game induced by players' types in settings of incomplete information. We now define two solution concepts, one for the complete information congestion game and the other for the incomplete information game.
be the cost function and s i ∈ U be the source-destination pair for each player i ∈ [n]. The routeprofile r is an η-approximate pure strategy Nash Equilibrium if for any other route r i ∈ R i , we have
It will commonly be the case that players do not know each other's types with certainty (because e.g. players consider their types to be sensitive information and do not disclose them, or purely because of the difficulty in communication amongst a large number of players) Hence, we would like to consider the incomplete information game, where players do not know the types of the other players. A Bayesian game is one in which player types are drawn from a commonly known prior distribution τ : (s 1 , · · · , s n ) ∼ τ . Note that τ is not necessarily a product distribution, and so this allows for arbitrary correlations between types. After a player knows his type s i that player will have a posterior distribution, denoted τ | si , on the types of the other players. A strategy for a player i ∈ [n] is a map g i : U → R. Given a vector v of n elements, we will use the convention of writing v −i to denote the vector of n − 1 elements which is identical to v but excludes the i'th index of v. We then denote the vector of strategies for everyone other than i as
is an η-approximate Bayes-Nash Equilibrium under τ if for each player i ∈ [n], for each type s i ∈ U and for every alternative strategy g i = g i we have
We now define differential privacy, which will be our main tool for controlling the sensitivity of our algorithms.
Definition 2.4. (Differential Privacy) A randomized algorithm M : T n → O n satisfies ( , δ)-differential privacy if for any player i, any two types s i , s i ∈ T , any tuple of types s −i ∈ T n−1 , and any B ⊆ O n we have
Computing a Nash equilibrium of a congestion game is plainly not possible under the constraint of differential privacy; players with different types have different sets of feasible actions, and so any algorithm that computes a feasible set of suggestions also reveals the type of each player. We consider here a relaxation of differential privacy that allows r i to depend arbitrarily on s i , but maintains that for all i, r −i is differentially private in s i .
Definition 2.5. (Joint Differential Privacy) A randomized algorithm M : T n → O n satisfies ( , δ)-joint differential privacy if simultaneously for every player i, any two types s i , s i ∈ T , any tuple of types s −i ∈ T n−1 and any B −i ⊆ O n−1 , we have
We now discuss games modified by the introduction of a mediator. A mediator is an algorithm M : (T ∪ {⊥}) n → O n which takes as input reported types (or ⊥ for any player who declines to use the mediator), and outputs a suggested action to each player. Given a routing game G, we construct a new game G M induced by the mediator M. Informally, in G M , players have several options: they can opt-out of the mediator (i.e. report ⊥) and select an action independently of it. Alternately they can opt-in and report to it some type (not necessarily their true type), and receive a suggested action r i . They are free to follow this suggestion or use it in some other way: they play an action f (r i ) for some arbitrary function f : O → O. Formally, the game G M has an action set A i for each player i defined as:
In the setting of congestion games (i.e. types from U and outcomes from R), let an action profile in
. Let F be the set of possible functions f : R → R. We define the cost functions in G M to be
PRIVATE MEDIATORS INDUCE TRUTHFUL BEHAVIOR
Here we state the motivating theorem of our paper: jointly-differentially private algorithms for computing Nash equilibria yield mediators that support truth-telling behavior in equilibrium, even in settings of incomplete information. The rest of the paper will be devoted to designing an algorithm that satisfies the hypotheses of the following theorem.
THEOREM 3.1. Let M be a mechanism satisfying ( , δ)-joint differential privacy that on any input type profile s with probability 1 − β computes an η-approximate pure strategy Nash Equilibrium of the complete information game defined by s. Then for every realized type profile s ∈ U, it is an η − approximate pure strategy Nash Equilibrium of the complete information game G M for each player i to play (s i , f i ) where s i is i's actual type, f i is the identity function for each i ∈ [n], and
We will call the action profile (s, f ) "good" behavior.
PROOF. For a player of type s i , define the action ρ i = (s i , f i ) in G M where player i reports s i and she uses the suggestion of M, i.e. f i is the identity function. Consider a change of strategy for player i, ρ i = (s i , f i ) where f i : R i → R i takes routes of reported type s i to the routes of her actual type s i . We seek to bound the difference
Let s be the reported type profile where player i is no longer reporting her true type, i.e. s −i = s −i but s i = s i . We define the best response route for a player of type s i given the route profile of the other players to be
We first condition on the event that M outputs an η approximate Nash Equilibrium (which occurs with probability at least 1 − β). We then know,
Next, we invoke the privacy condition:
The first inequality follows from joint differential privacy, the second from the inequality e ≤ 1 + 2 together with the fact that L is an upper bound on the cost function, and the third from the definition of the best response. Combining this analysis with the β-probability event that the mechanism fails to output an approximate Nash equilibrium (and hence any player might be able to reduce his cost by L) gives the result:
The above theorem states that good behavior forms an approximate equilibrium in G M for every realization of types. Therefore, an immediate corollary is that good behavior forms an approximate Bayes-Nash equilibrium for every distribution τ over types.
COROLLARY 3.2. Let M be a mechanism satisfying ( , δ)-joint differential privacy that on any input type profile s with probability 1 − β computes an η-approximate pure strategy Nash Equilibrium of the complete information game defined by s. Then for every prior distribution τ over the type space U, it is an η − approximate Bayes-Nash Equilibrium of G M for each player to have "good" behavior, and η = η + 2L + Lβ + δ.
Our main technical result is a jointly-differentially private algorithm that computes an approximate Nash equilibrium in low-sensitivity congestion games. We here state an informal version of our theorem (with some parameters hidden) assuming sensitivity ∆ = O(1/n). In the general case, ∆ appears in our theorem as a parameter.
THEOREM (INFORMAL).
There is an ( , δ)-jointly differentially private algorithm that computes η-approximate Nash equilibria in congestion games for:
Using this mechanism to instantiate Theorem 3.1, we obtain the following corollary, which is our main result: THEOREM (INFORMAL). There is a mediator M such that "good behavior" forms an η -approximate Bayes-Nash Equilibrium of G M for every prior τ , for:
Moreover, when players play according to this equilibrium, the resulting play forms an η -approximate Nash equilibrium of the underlying complete information game induced by the realized player types.
Note that η tends to zero at a polynomial rate as the size of the game n grows: hence asymptotically, truthtelling forms an exact equilibrium. A formal statement of our results, together with a description of the algorithm, and all corresponding proofs, can be found in the full version of our paper, a pre-print of which is available on arXiv [Rogers and Roth 2013] .
CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this paper we have shown how to implement equilibria of complete information games defined by realized types in settings of incomplete information, when the un-derlying game is a large congestion game. We carry out this implementation via the use of an extremely weak mediator (e.g. a "smart" GPS device) that nobody is forced to use, nor truthfully report types to, and which only has the power to make suggestions that nobody need follow. Our notion of implementation is asymptotic: good behavior is supported as an approximate equilibrium of the incomplete information game, and it induces an approximate Nash equilibrium of the induced complete information game, where here both approximation factors become exact as the size of the game grows large. The technical tool that we use to implement the mediator is private equilibrium computation.
Left open are a number of fascinating questions. Here are two that we find particularly interesting:
(1) Can the approximation factors be completely eliminated, and can Nash equilibria of the complete information game be implemented as exact Bayes-Nash equilibria of the incomplete information game (via any approach, not necessarily via differential privacy)? What about as dominant strategy equilibria? This is related to the question of when equilibrium selection mechanisms can be made truthful in small games. (2) Can our approach in principle be extended beyond congestion games? This question is related to whether or not there exists in general a jointly-differentially private algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria in general games. Note that this is a purely information theoretic question, independent of computational considerations (since of course we do not expect that there are computationally efficient algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in general games).
